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Abstract
The present study aims at differentiating between semantically-coded and pragmatically-
conditioned meaning components of Polish and German sentence adverbs whose meaning 
is conventionally associated with hearsay (≈ Eng. allegedly, reportedly, supposedly). In the 
current part of the study, we argue why our objective should be reached on the basis of 
Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), and we show which particular commu-
nicative principles distinguished in Neo-Gricean frameworks can sensibly be considered 
as triggers of GCIs that evoke ‘epistemic overtones’ in the use of hearsay adverbs. We dif-
ferentiate between GCIs which work for all relevant adverbs and implicatures which only 
apply to more individual properties of hearsay adverbs on more specific, “deeper” levels of 
their meaning structure. In accordance with this more descriptive task, we discuss general 
issues concerning presumable hierarchies of factors that influence (trigger or cancel) epis-
temic implicatures in the usage of lexical markers of information source. We argue that 
many discourse properties on the semantics-pragmatics interface which are characteristic 
of grammatical evidentials also hold true for lexical markers of information source. 
Keywords
Polish, German, reportive evidentiality, sentence adverbs, Generalized Conversational Im-
plicatures, coded vs. inferred meaning
Streszczenie
Artykuł stanowi próbę rozróżnienia zakodowanych semantycznie oraz uwarunkow-
anych pragmatycznie komponentów znaczenia polskich i niemieckich reportatywnych 
przysłówków zdaniowych (ang. allegedly, reportedly, supposedly). W niniejszej, drugiej 
części artykułu na podstawie teorii Uogólnionych Implikatur Konwersacyjnych (General-
ized Conversational Implicatures, GCI) pokazujemy, w jaki sposób mechanizmy komuni-
kacyjne przyjęte w ujęciach neo-Grice’owskich prowadzą do GCI nadających przysłówkom 
reportatywnym zabarwienie epistemiczne. Rozróżniamy przy tym GCI towarzyszące 
użyciu wszystkich przysłówków reportatywnych oraz te implikatury, które wiążą się z ich 
76 Björn Wiemer, Anna Socka
indywidualnymi cechami na głębszym poziomie struktury znaczeniowej. Następnie po-
ruszamy problem ogólniejszy, dotyczący przypuszczalnych hierarchii czynników, które 
wywołują (lub znoszą) implikatury epistemiczne u jednostek leksykalnych wyrażających 
źródło informacji. Uważamy, że jednostki te wykazują na poziomie dyskursu wiele 
właściwości dotyczących styku semantyki i pragmatyki, które dotychczas przypisywano 
tylko gramatycznym eksponentom ewidencjalności.
Słowa kluczowe
język polski, język niemiecki, ewidencjalność reportatywna, przysłówki sentencjalne, uogól-
nione implikatury konwersacyjne, znaczenie zakodowane vs. znaczenie wywnioskowane
In the first part of this paper published in the preceding issue of this journal 
(Wiemer and Socka 2017), we presented a systematic corpus study of hearsay 
adverbs in Polish and German providing the empirical basis for the conclu-
sions that we want to draw in this part.
3. A proposal of how to explain the facts
How can we make sense of the facts assembled in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Sec-
tion 2.2)? We are first going to justify why we think that the relation between re-
portive justification and epistemic judgment can best be characterized as result-
ing from Generalized Conversational Implicature. Probably, another name for this 
property is ‘default’, in the same way as, in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.2), 
we pointed out origo-exclusiveness as a feature of rzekomo (in distinction to other 
Polish allegedly-units) that, on the one hand, arises independently of the spe-
cific context and, on the other hand, can be canceled by other factors. Apart from 
this individual feature of rzekomo, we are making the more general claim that only 
the evidential (reportive) component is inherent to all allegedly-units in Polish 
and German, while epistemic overtones result from an interaction of this stable 
(i.e. coded) meaning with some general assumptions about the way communica-
tion works (3.1). Then we try to establish, on Neo-Gricean grounds, which spe-
cific kind of implicature is responsible for the assumed mechanism (3.2), and we 
discuss some more far-reaching consequences of this analysis of different kinds 
of implicatures for the semantic-pragmatics interface of evidential markers (3.3).
3.1. Epistemic overtones as the result of Generalized Conver-
sational Implicatures
Our own proposal amounts to ascribing the epistemic overtones in the exam-
ined units the status of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (henceforth 
GCI). According to Levinson (2000: 16), GCIs differ from Particularized Con-
versational Implicatures in the following way: 
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[1] a)  An implicature I from utterance U is particularized iff U implicates I only by 
virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even nor-
mally obtain.
 b)  An implicature I is generalized iff U implicates I unless there are unusual specific 
contextual assumptions that defeat it.
GCIs take place as preferred, or default, interpretations that are canceled 
(or blocked) only under some specific conditions. GCIs are associated with ut-
terance-type meanings, which Levinson postulates to be a third kind of mean-
ing because they cannot be reduced to either sentence-type-meaning or utter-
ance-token-meaning, but rather belong to “a level of systematic pragmatic 
inference not based on direct computations about speaker-intentions but on 
general expectations about how language is normally used” (Levinson 2000: 
20; emphasis added, BW/AS).
Among other things, the observations made in Wiemer and Socka (2017: 
Section 2.2) show that, on the one hand, any of the reportive adverbs (a) eas-
ily triggers (or: is compatible with) an implicature of negative epistemic assess-
ment, but, on the other hand, (b) any of these units allows this implicature to 
be canceled. Admittedly, the contextual conditions on which this occurs differ. 
They are obviously most specific for Pol. rzekomo and, probably, Germ. ange-
blich. But this difference can be captured by introducing defaults (or, converse-
ly, defeatability) of different strength. We could claim that for Pol. rzekomo the 
default of implicating negative epistemic judgment is stronger than for jakoby 
and podobno. How ‘epistemic strength’ might be reliably assigned and used as 
a falsifiable comparative concept on any sort of scale is an issue that, at pre-
sent, we do not want, and do not need, to decide upon. What is important here 
is that news reports about purported violations of laws (and similar kinds of 
discourse) readily supply contexts that defeat this implicature (= default as-
sumption).
For the same reason, we can justify why the component of epistemic judg-
ment for, e.g., rzekomo cannot be characterized as Conventional Implicature. If 
it could, we would expect this component to be neither calculable, nor cancela-
ble (so that it would have to be stipulated in the adverb’s lexical entry as its in-
dividual feature). But as we saw, it can be canceled even in rzekomo, so that this 
unit basically behaves like the other reportive adverbs, irrespective of whatever 
strength of default we might wish to assign to it.
Apart from that, it has been claimed that conversational implicatures tend 
to be universal, whereas conventional ones tend not to be universal. This leaves 
us with the question of how universal (i.e. culture-independent) conversa-
tional implicatures characteristic of reportive adverbs (or other propositional 
modifiers) are, regardless of which kind of principle is responsible for the GCI 
(see 3.2). We will return to this issue in section 4.
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3.2. Which specific kind of GCI is at work?
Now we are going to discuss which mechanism causes the supposed machin-
ery on the lexicon-pragmatics interface to work. For this purpose, we rely on a 
Neo-Gricean approach defended and summarized in Huang (2007).
3.2.1. Principles based on the Quantity maxim:1
These principles are usually explicated in the following schematic way. Note 
that they (as well as other principles below) are divided up between speaker 
and addressee:
[2] Speaker: Do not say less than is required (bearing the I-principle in mind).
 Addressee: What is not said is not the case. (Huang 2007: 41)
The Quantity maxim is subdivided into those based on scalar implicatures 
and on clausal implicatures. We turn to each of these now.
3.2.1.1. Based on Horn-scale (Horn’s Q-principle), or Q-scalar implicatures?
Scalar implicatures take the general form
[3] Q-scalar : <x, y >
            y + > Q-scalar ~x (Huang 2007: 42)
2
We see quite quickly that this kind of implicature cannot be responsible for 
the epistemic overtones of hearsay adverbs. If – on the basis of scalar assump-
tions mentioned after Ramat and Ricca (1998) in Wiemer and Socka (2017: 
Section 2.2) – we assume that the epistemic component (negative stance) con-
stitutes a scale and x = allegedly (rzekomo), y = reportedly (podobno), then by 
using reportedly, the speaker implicates ~allegedly. Or, the other way round, 
x should entail y. With units of standard Horn-scales this allows one to say, e.g.
(26) The soup is not only warm, but hot.
 She’s not just good, she’s excellent.
 That’s not only bad, but disastrous.
1 Q-alternate implicatures are not considered here as they seem to us to be of minor (if any) 
importance to the present issue. In some regards, Q-alternate implicatures show resemblance to 
M-implicatures, which likewise do not appear very helpful in understanding what is going 
on with “our case” (see 3.2.3). The main difference between Q-ordered alternate and Q-clausal implica-
tures is that, in the former, no entailment between the elements of the set holds true (cf. Huang 
2007: 44).
2 A Horn-scale <x, y> consists of an informationally weaker element y and an information-
ally stronger element x, e.g. <identical, similar>. Then the assertion of y implicates the negation 
of x.
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We can hardly find an analogy with reportive sentence adverbs:
(27) *He has broken his leg not reportedly, but allegedly.
 *Złamał sobie nogę nie podobno, tylko rzekomo.
Apart from the fact that such adverbs take scope over whole propositions 
(and that this property precludes them from being negated, unless metalin-
guistically, or being focused on), an entailment relation of epistemic strength 
with the item conveying a stronger negative commitment toward P (= x, al-
legedly, rzekomo) and entailing the weaker one (= y, reportedly, podobno) is 
inappropriate from the communicative point of view. For, by uttering (27), 
a speaker would practically be conveying: ?‘P, and this is not hearsay and I’m 
not committed to its truth, but it’s hearsay and I do not trust it’. Beside the issue 
of entailment, what is disturbing here is the common and non-cancelable re-
portive component of both adverbs: it obviously dominates over the epistemic 
element, and there is no sense in repeating this common reference to the kind 
of source of information. This would, however, be inevitable if we would use 
both adverbs in an order convenient to making an entailment explicit.
See also the inverse order, by which we could strengthen an implicature:
(28) *Złamał sobie nogę podobno, a nawet rzekomo.
 ‘He has broken his leg podobno, in fact rzekomo.’
≈ *He apparently / reportedly has broken his leg, in fact allegedly.
If rzekomo really entailed podobno and both items could be arranged ac-
cording to a Horn-scale, such an utterance should not be deviant (compare: He 
has three children, in fact four).
Furthermore, empirical observations show that podobno (= y) does not 
exclude P being false (it simply says that the speaker is ‘agnostic’ in this re-
spect); and, in turn, the negative epistemic stance implicated by rzekomo 
(= x) does not always hold true (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2). 
Such an observation would be impossible with items arranged on a typical 
Horn-scale, which (as all principles based on the Quantity maxim) induce an 
upper-bounding implicature:
[4]  A speaker, in saying ‘... p ...’, conversationally implicates that (for all he or she knows) 
‘... at most p ...’.
3.2.1.2. Based on clausal implicature?
This sort of Quantity-based implicature is usually formalized in the following 
way:
[5] Q-clausal : <X(p), Y(p)>
            Y(p) +> Q-clausal p, ~p (Huang 2007: 42)
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It is tempting to explain the relation between evidential adverbs like Pol. 
podobno, jakoby and rzekomo on the basis of clausal implicatures since, origi-
nally, these have been formulated as inferences of epistemic uncertainty. Com-
pare two of the typical examples given by Levinson (2007: 136) and Huang 
(2007: 43) respectively:
(29) I know that John is away. (= X(p))
(30) I believe that John is away.  (= Y(p))
(31a) <necessarily p, possibly p>
(31b) It’s possible that Buddhism is the world’s oldest living religion.
(31c)  +>  ‘It’s possible that Buddhism is the world’s oldest living religion, and it’s pos-
sible that Buddhism isn’t the world’s oldest living religion.’ – or:
(31c’)  +>  ‘It’s not necessarily the case that Buddhism is the world’s oldest living reli-
gion.’
By analogy, applied to “our” reportive adverbs, we should expect that using 
the unit whose negative epistemic default is weaker (i.e. easier to defeat) im-
plies that it was not intended to bring about this negative assessment (or: that 
the speaker wanted to remain ‘epistemically agnostic’). That is, by saying (32a), 
we would imply (32b):
(32a) Podobno P.
(32b)  +> ‘... It’s possible that P is true, and it’s possible that P isn’t true.’3
This observation is in agreement with the assumption (formulated according to 
Ramat and Ricca 1998 in Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2.1) that, if within 
a pair (or set) of reportive adverbs a member is neutral (‘agnostic’) with respect 
to epistemic judgment, this potential epistemic load equals more or less 50% on 
the epistemic scale. The problem, however, is why podobno should be ascribed 
the status of the marked member. There is no semantic (or common sense) rea-
son to regard either of these two (or jakoby) as marked or unmarked in terms of 
intralingual (or paradigmatic) opposition. Leaving aside preferences of register 
or style, neither rzekomo, nor podobno can be regarded as preferred, in many 
cases they are even mutually substitutable (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 
2.2). After all, we are not sure whether this does not hold true for pairs like Engl. 
allegedly vs. reportedly (and apparently etc.) as well.
3 Actually, this paraphrase can easily be introduced into Wierzbicka-like explications used 
in Wiemer (2006). Obviously, the reasoning which led to these explications were implicitly guid-
ed by Q-clausal-implicatures.
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Another, probably connected, problem arising with GCIs based on clausal im-
plicatures is that the relation between know and believe is one between a (semi-)
factive and a non-factive verb, whereas both rzekomo and podobno modify prop-
ositions to the extent that their factivity is suspended. That is why rzekomo would 
lead to the same formulation in the implicature which has been given in (32b). Fi-
nally, the application of Q-clausal-implicatures hinges on the assumption that rzeko-
mo is endowed with a stronger default of negative epistemic stance in every kind 
of context. This assumption, however, has proven to not be tenable, as has been 
shown by the ability for this default to be defeated, even with rzekomo and given 
specific communicative conditions (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2.2).
3.2.2. Based on the I(nformativeness)-Principle?
The I-principle is normally given the general form
[6] I-scale : [x, y]
             y +> I x (Huang 2007: 47)
Again, if paraphrased, this schema has to be given differently for speaker 
and addressee:
[7] Speaker: Do not say more than is required (bearing the Q-principle in mind).
 Addressee:  What is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified. 
(Huang 2007: 46)
Thus:
[8]  A speaker in saying ‘... p ...’, conversationally implicates that (for all he or she knows) 
‘... more than p ...’. (vs. [4])
Standard examples to illustrate how this works with natural language utter-
ances are the following ones (cf. Huang 2007: 46):
(33a) p and q +> p and then q / therefore q
(33b)  John pressed the spring and (+> then) the drawer opened / and (+> thereby) caused 
the drawer to open.
(34a) frame-based inference
(34b) Mary pushed the cart to the checkout.
   +>  Mary pushed the cart full of groceries to the supermarket checkout in order 
to pay for them (and so on).
The Q- and the I-Principle are sort of antagonists: contrary to the Q-Princi-
ple, the I-Principle assumes a lower-bounding implicature. Thus, the most im-
portant difference between Q- and I-implicatures is that, while Q-implicatures 
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exclude a stronger element (function, meaning) that is not meant, I-implica-
tures enrich the utterance toward some stronger (more specific) information 
that was not stated. Thus, I-implicatures typically arise from stereotypical as-
sumptions.
It is this property which makes it attractive to regard the relation between 
the German and Polish allegedly-units as an instance of I-based implica-
tures. This type of implicature also has the advantage (in comparison to Q-
based implicatures) of not needing to operate on a set (and, therefore, a po-
tential paradigmatic contrast) of items. Thus, we may also investigate Pol. 
podobno, ponoć, jakoby, podobno independently from each other, as we can in-
vestigate Germ. angeblich which, as a reportive marker, obviously has no good 
“counterpart” on an epistemic scale (i.e. it does not build a widespread contrast 
with other reportive sentence adverbs).
Thus, the I-principle seems to be a good tool to capture the often observed 
implicature of negative epistemic stance (doubt) arising from reportive mark-
ers. The usual way to explain this implicature (‘hearsay +> speaker is uncertain 
as for whether P obtains, or has obtained’) is by arguing as follows: if the speak-
er refers to previous utterances made by other people (another person), the 
speaker does not subscribe to the truth of the propositional content of these 
utterances being referred to. In other words: it is easy to turn epistemic agnos-
ticism into epistemic reservation (scepticism) or even a downright refusal of P 
being true. Inherent to this kind of reasoning is an enrichment of what is said. 
What is lexically conveyed by all sentence adverbs considered here is a repor-
tive, thus an evidential, value; all the time the question is as to what extent and 
due to which mechanism these units also convey the speaker’s epistemic judg-
ment concerning P. This provided, we are able to view the reportive value as 
referring to what is explicitly said, while the epistemic judgment results from 
an enrichment of what is explicitly said.
We will return to this point below, after examining the M-principle.
3.2.3. Based on the M(anner)-Principle?
The M-Principle usually takes on the following form:
[9] M-scale : {x, y}
   y +> M ~x (Huang 2007: 51)
[10] Speaker: Do not use a marked expression without reason.
 Addressee: What is said in a marked way is not unmarked. (Huang 2007: 50)
One might wonder whether this principle can really apply to “our case”. 
Consider its characterization by Huang (2007: 51):
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Unlike the Q- and I-principles, which operate primarily in terms of semantic infor-
mativeness, the metalinguistic M-principle operates primarily in terms of a set of al-
ternates that contrast in form. The fundamental axiom upon which this principle rests 
is that the use of a marked expression M-implicates the negation of the interpretation 
associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked expression in the same set. Putting 
it another way, from the use of a marked linguistic expression, one infers that the ste-
reotypical interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked linguistic 
expression does not obtain (...).
Here is one of Huang’s examples (2007: 51):
(35a) John stopped the car.
   +> John stopped the car in the usual manner.
(35b) John caused the car to stop.
   +> John stopped the car in an unusual way, for example, by bumping into a wall.
At first sight, there are a couple of considerations that might speak against 
the M-principle being a viable tool for capturing the relationship between re-
portive sentence adverbs. Basically, these considerations apply as long as we 
consider paradigmatic relations just between lexical items (i.e. the reportive 
sentence adverbs under study):
a) Like Q-Principles, the M-principle assumes an (at last implicit) set of 
alternates. Thus, it would be difficult to apply it to cases like Germ. an-
geblich, which does not stand in a reasonably frequent opposition to an-
other reportive adverb.
b) The M-principle builds on expressions which are always marked (and 
thus produce an implicit contrast with unmarked, or expected, expres-
sions), i.e. the expression triggering the implicature is marked per se (in 
the given contextual or situational surrounding). However, none of the 
reportive adverbs we have been examining can be considered as being so 
marked, or unexpected. Typically, if there is a choice between at least two 
adverbs – as in Polish or English – the epistemically stronger one seems 
to be the unmarked one (see Figure 2; see Wiemer and Socka 2017: 2.2.1).
c) As stated by Huang (see above), the M-principle primarily operates on a 
contrast in form. Usually this manifests itself in the addition of an affix 
or otherwise longer expressions (double negation, complex predicates, 
etc.). No such relation holds true between “our” reportive adverbs.
However, we may object that the very use of a reportive adverb (particu-
larly in languages for which there are no obligatory evidentials) creates a con-
trast with an unmodified declarative sentence (in the indicative). If we start 
considering the relation not between alternatives of lexical items (or mor-
phemes) able to occupy slots (in word forms or clause structure), but rather 
between whole utterances (each endowed with propositional content), things 
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look different. A pair of simple sentences like (36a–b) for Polish, which differ 
only with respect to the absence vs. presence of a reportive adverb, acquires 
a contrast comparable to the contrast in the textbook example (35a–b):
(36a) Nie przyszedłeś na ostatnie zebranie.
   ‘You didn’t come to the last meeting.’
(36b) Podobno / rzekomo nie przyszedłeś na ostatnie zebranie.
   ‘Reportedly / Allegedly, you didn’t come to the last meeting.’
Such a contrast was also inherent to the test for dissent adduced in Wiemer 
and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.1; ex. 2–3). Crucially, the additional report-
ive adverb introduced into (36b), insofar as interlocutors need not expect it, 
is communicatively marked, or rather: it adds to the utterance which it modi-
fies a reportive metacomment. This, in turn, supplies a trigger to evoke an 
I-implicature, i.e. to make the addressee infer that the speaker might have 
meant something more than they actually said (“Why did the speaker not 
just utter an indicative statement without a modifier?”). By using podobno 
etc., the speaker did say that the proposition is “valid” on the basis of hear-
say, but the inferred “surplus value” makes the addressee inclined to impute 
more. This inference might be stronger (or: more natural), the less stereotypi-
cal an utterance with podobno, rzekomo etc. is in the given speech community 
and under the specific type of contextual/situational conditions. Therefore, we 
would not like to entirely dismiss the M-principle as a sensible cue for explain-
ing epistemic overtones as a GCI with hearsay adverbs. In a sense, it may even 
conspire with the I-principle.
3.3. Trying to gather the harvest
We are, therefore, left with the following question: What kind of implicature is 
the most appropriate one to capture the nature of the relationship between re-
portive adverbs (in intralingual comparison): clausal Q-implicature, I-impli-
cature, or, after all, M-implicature? Or is it a combination of two, or even of all 
three of them?
In 3.2.1.2, we hinted at problems that would arise if we based GCI only on a 
Q-clause-mechanism. The GCI appears to be explained better if it is based on 
the I-principle; the advantages of assuming this have been argued for in 3.2.2. 
But note that each of these principles is formulated separately: either from the 
perspective of the speaker, or from the point of view of the addressee. Here we 
repeat their explication for convenience: 
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Based on the Quantity Principle
[2] Speaker:  Do not say less than is required (bearing the I-principle in mind).
 Addressee: What is not said is not the case.
Based on the Informativeness Principle
[7] Speaker: Do not say more than is required (bearing the Q-principle in mind).
 Addressee: What is generally said is stereotypically and specifically exemplified.
As we showed in 3.2.3, the I-based assumption of the addressee may, in 
turn, be triggered by an M-implicature. Thus, I- and M-implicatures may work 
together, as though creating a domino effect.
We should take into consideration that Q- and I-based or M-based prin-
ciples might also combine, but the speaker and addressee differ as to which 
of the two they “choose.” Provided the speaker abides by the Q-based princi-
ple, they are thereby anxious not to leave out an indication of hearsay as the 
source of information (the speaker, as it were, wishes to be “honest” by “being 
accurate”). On the contrary, the addressee might process the perceived utter-
ance by applying “their” part of the I- or M-principle. Instead of being restric-
tive concerning the meaning potential of the utterance, the addressee enriches 
it, relying on the usual associations connected to hearsay. In other words: the 
addressee might impute something (namely: epistemic reservation) into the 
speaker’s message which they had not intended to be implicated (or which 
they might even have wished to avoid).
This reasoning – if it proves correct – implies at least three things: (i) 
I-implicatures acquire key significance since they serve as a kind of bridging 
element between Q- and M-implicatures; (ii) the relation between reportive 
meaning and epistemic implicature can, as it were, be (unconsciously) nego-
tiated; (iii) in actual discourse, epistemic overtones might arise via a commu-
nicative (i.e. illocutionary) mismatch between the interlocutors. In any way, 
it can fluctuate and is subject to subtle “misinterpretations”: it is possible that 
the addressee interprets the utterance in another way than was intended by the 
speaker because the addressee relies on a pragmatic principle that is in conflict 
with an antagonistic principle. 
Let us finish this section by trying to answer the question of why it is texts 
(discourse) potentially bearing legal consequences (news reports etc.) in which 
epistemic overtones implicated by virtue of GCI are often canceled (as is usual-
ly the case, first of all, with Pol. rzekomo, or Germ. angeblich and mutmaßlich). 
It seems that the answer can be derived from the ‘Implicature cancelation pro-
cedure’, first formulated in Gazdar (1979) and afterwards adapted by Huang 
(2007: 54), who we cite for the hierarchy of factors given in [11]:4
4 Metalinguistic negation (which is not always applicable) should be added as another factor 
somewhere in the upper section of the hierarchy.
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[11]  Implicature cancelation procedure
  (a) background assumptions
  (b) contextual factors
  (c) semantic entailments
  (d) conversational implicatures
    (i)   Q-implicatures
    (1) Q-clausal implicatures
    (2) Q-scalar implicatures
    (ii)  M-implicatures
    (iii) I-implicatures
This set of conditions has to be read as an implicational hierarchy: every 
factor that is lower on the hierarchy is weaker than the factors above it. I-impli-
catures are the weakest kind of inferential trigger and can be overridden most 
easily, while background assumptions (world knowledge etc.) are the strong-
est factor and can hardly be abandoned by any other condition in natural dis-
course. Thus, given a GCI (i.e. its result in the interpretation of a linguistic unit 
or utterance) that rests on an I-implicature, it will be canceled by an M-impli-
cature, and so on.
Now, knowledge about possible legal consequences of an assertion in 
a news report belongs to the background knowledge of the journalist (and 
probably their readers, too), as does knowledge about the significance and 
function of different text genres. In light of Gazdar’s hierarchy, it is not surpris-
ing that this kind of knowledge outrules the normal GCI carried by the inves-
tigated allegedly-units, regardless of their purported “strength” of epistemic 
reservation.
Curiously, the kinds of implicature which have turned out to be the best 
candidates capable of explaining the GCI of epistemic commitment triggered 
by reportive adverbs occupy the lowest, i.e. weakest places in Gazdar’s hierar-
chy. This observation might be helpful in explaining why epistemic implica-
tures evoked by reportive adverbs are so vulnerable and, thus, prone to dia-
chronic change: they may become conventionalized, they may vanish, or they 
may just “hover” all the time as GCIs. Together with imaginable misunder-
standings occurring on a communicative micro-level, which we considered 
above, the weak force of the I- and the M-Principle might be used as “neural-
gic spots” to capture the differences of meaning potential between otherwise 
equivalent hearsay markers and the reasons of their change into (reportive) 
evidentiality (and, maybe, out of it).
This suggestion leads us to the next section.
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4. Consequences for crosslinguistic studies and 
lexicography
We have now arrived at a stage in which we can take up one of Aikhenvald’s ob-
servations concerning the pragmatic potential of evidential markers or equiva-
lent means of information source: “(...) in many languages, speech reports 
acquire epistemic overtones. Saying ‘He says he is a doctor’ may be meant to 
cast doubt over his qualifications. In some languages, speech reports are used 
to transmit something one does not really believe. These connotations are far 
from universal—they have not been attested in Hinuq, Tatar, or Saaroa” (Ai-
khenvald 2014: 26). Epistemic implicatures have been attested for markers of 
evidentiality (or information source) regardless of their grammatical or lexical 
status. On the one hand, “[s]peakers of any language can express the informa-
tion source lexically if they need to. But such lexical explanations may produce 
additional illocutionary effects”, such as distrust (Aikhenvald 2004: 338). This 
also applies to diverse means acknowledged by Aikhenvald as ‘evidential strat-
egies’. As for grammatical evidentials, in turn, “the reported evidential in Tari-
ana has connotations of ‘unreliability’ and distancing oneself from the source” 
(Aikhenvald 2004: 352) as well. On the other hand, there are plentiful exam-
ples in different parts of the world demonstrating that grammatical evidentials 
do not trigger any epistemic implicatures (Aikhenvald 2004, passim, among 
others), and our analysis of reportive sentence adverbs in two European lan-
guages has, as we hope, shown that epistemic implicatures are not necessarily 
an “ingredient” to the meaning of such lexical markers of information source, 
either, or at least that such implicatures can easily be canceled. Furthermore, 
Aikhenvald (2004: ch. 10–11) has convincingly shown that an appropriate us-
age of evidential markers to a large extent depends on cultural conventions, in 
particular on a knowledge of social relations and discourse genres (see espe-
cially p. 344). Note that these kinds of factors rank highest on Gazdar’s hierar-
chy in [11] (‘background assumptions’, ‘contextual factors’).
It is also these two types of factors that seem to rank highest in the use 
(vs. avoidance) of Bulgarian verbal non-firsthand forms (Bulg. preizkazni for-
mi); they represent another evidential strategy, but are based on grammati-
cal paradigms. These forms cannot be ascribed an inherent epistemic compo-
nent, either; overtones of distrust can be explained on the basis of a GCI, too. 
However, contrary to the German and Polish allegedly-units, the Bulgar-
ian forms are avoided in contexts of juridical responsibility and whenever the 
author does not want to appear unbelievable, while they are frequently used 
in all sorts of argumentative discourse when the speaker/writer polemicizes 
with an opponent’s views. Apart from that, they occur in true re-narration and 
the relation of historical facts; cf. Wiemer and Kampf (2012 [2015]: 23–26, 
33f.), where it was argued that seemingly contradictory facts about the usage 
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of Bulgarian non-firsthand forms can be given a coherent explanation only 
provided we assume that these forms are by themselves epistemically neutral, 
and that it is exactly because of their non-committal character that they lend 
themselves to context-conditioned implicatures triggered, or inhibited, on the 
basis of “macro-illocutionary” purposes (set, among others, by institutional 
frames or discourse genres), i.e., again, by factors occupying high positions in 
Gazdar’s hierarchy.
Against this background, let us return to the claim that conversational im-
plicatures tend to be universal, whereas conventional ones tend not to be uni-
versal (see 3.1). It raises the (rather anthropological) question of how culture-
independent conversational implicatures actually are, in particular when it 
comes to the meaning (or use) of reportive sentence adverbs (or other proposi-
tional modifiers). This issue, in turn, bears on linguistic practice, both in con-
siderations on the semantics-pragmatics interface and in lexicography. Name-
ly, our analysis in  section 2 in Wiemer and Socka (2017) and in section 3 here 
led to the exclusion of an inherent epistemic component in, for instance, Germ. 
angeblich or Pol. rzekomo and jakoby. This component can be predicted due to 
a GCI. Since this implicature is generalized, we can, for reasons of economy, 
skip it in a semantic, or lexicographic, account of the respective hearsay mark-
ers; speakers presumably calculate it on the basis of usual assumptions regard-
ing “how communication goes” (in their community). However, if such usual 
assumptions prove to not be universal, we can apply the economy principle at 
best for the description of reportive sentence adverbs of individual languages 
(like Polish or German and probably most, if not all, European languages), but 
should refrain from it in a global, crosslinguistic comparison. We would, then, 
again have to stipulate it in the description of each reportive sentence adverb of 
a particular language, or it has to be specified for each language in toto that, by 
default, this GCI works with its reportive sentence adverbs (or particles, for that 
matter) so that we can dispense with an indication of epistemic components in 
the description of individual lexical items in that, but only for that, language.
Apart from this, the relation between evidential and epistemic components 
in reportive markers can underlie diachronic change and, correspondingly, may 
differ even for cognate units of closely related languages. For instance, what 
happens to be best characterized as a GCI in a Polish lexeme, can turn out to be 
a conventionalized (non-cancelable) part of meaning in an etymologically re-
lated item in Russian. This is exactly what can be demonstrated by a compari-
son of Pol. jakoby with Russ. jàkoby (à indicates stress). In contemporary Rus-
sian, jakoby is a reportive marker which carries an epistemic overtone of doubt 
about the reported P that, contrary to its Polish cognate, cannot be defeated. 
Together with this, the epistemic component differs, insofar as the degree of 
conviction that the reported P does not hold is stronger. In fact, it amounts to 
rejection of the reported P. See Rakhilina (1996) and Plungjan (2008: 305), who 
89How much does pragmatics help to contrast the meaning of hearsay adverbs? (Part 2)
proposed the following periphrasis to approximate this component of jakoby’s 
meaning (in addition to reference to hearsay; translation ours):
[12] ‘Some people think that P is true; I don’t think so.’
Compare but one typical example:
(37)  Nikolaev i Golubovič obvinjalis’ v tom, čto oni jakoby nanesli neskol’ko udarov drev- 
kom flaga sotrudniku milicii. Pri takix xarakterizujuščix dannyx (...) nikogo i niko-
gda ne arestovyvajut i ne sažajut. Zdes’ že Tverskoj sud Moskvy dal im po tri goda 
lišenija svobody! Ėto pri tom, čto u poterpevšego milicionera edinstvennym posled-
stviem „izbienija“ bylo povyšenie po službe. (NKRJa; Andrej Andreev: “Buduščee 
prinadležit nam!” (2003) // «Zavtra», 2003.08.22)
(38)  ‘Nikolaev and Golubovič were accused of {jàkoby} having beaten up a representa-
tive of the police by hitting him several times with a flag shaft. For such actions no-
body had ever been arrested, nor put in prison. But the court of the Tverskoj district 
in Moscow sentenced each of them to three years in prison! All this is especially 
strange given the fact that, for the victim, the only consequence of being “beaten 
up” was his promotion in service.’
We have not come across any examples showing (nor assertions in research 
literature claiming) that component [12] could be canceled. We can, thus, safe-
ly assume that the epistemic component does not just result from a GCI, but 
is – together with the hearsay reference – a stable (i.e. coded) element of this 
unit’s meaning.
In Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.2), we noticed that Polish alleged-
ly-units differ in subtle ways that certainly reflect differences on deeper levels of 
their meaning structure. We also noted that specialists appear to be unanimous as 
to where these differences are located. A salient case in point is Pol. ponoć, which 
comes close to Pol. jakoby in argumentative discourse and (for this reason?) is 
considered by some specialists to imply a non-cancelable element of doubt. The 
reasons for such individual behavior of these reportive adverbs certainly reside in 
additional components of their meaning potential, which are often absent in evi-
dential markers of a more grammatical nature. These additional meaning com-
ponents have not been “stripped down” in the adverbs, but if we abstract away 
from individual features we can, nonetheless, arrange these adverbs on a gradient 
of epistemic strength (as in Figure 3; see Wiemer and Socka 2017: 2.2.2), and we 
should try to distinguish for which of them the epistemic component is coded, 
and for which it is inferred. This holds true for both intra- and interlingual com-
parison. What unites them is their common reportive core.
Let us finish with a brief comparison of Basque omen, which is classified 
as a particle in Alcázar (2010) and Korta and Zubeldia (2014), but otherwise 
shows striking similarities with Polish and German allegedly-units. Omen 
demonstrates the same behavior in a test of dissent as was applied in section 2 in 
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Wiemer and Socka (2017) and in section 3 here. Omen, however, is more “liber-
al” under the scope of sentential negation, insofar as a clause modified by omen 
can function as a complement of a negated predicate higher in the constituent 
structure; see Korta and Zubeldia’s example (their ex. 24, their translation):
(38) Ez da egia  euri-a  ari  omen
	 	neg  be.3sg.abs.prs  true.det.sg  rain-det.sg.abs		 prog		 hs
  d-u-ela.
	 	3sg.abs.prs-have-comp
  ‘It is not true that it is stated that it is raining.’5
Korta and Zubeldia show the same effect arising after some epistemic com-
plement-taking predicates (CTPs) and subsume these findings: “the evidential 
content can be dissented with, as far as the participants’ intuitions are con-
cerned, and (...) the evidential content gets narrow scope within some opera-
tors” (Korta and Zubeldia 2014: 405). The Polish and German allegedly-
units at least cannot be used in clausal arguments of negated CTPs related to 
cognition or epistemic attitudes (as in ex. 38 for Basque); see (39a, 40a). They 
also cannot occur (or sound utterly weird) even under non-negated cognitive/
epistemic CTPs (unless uttered as a rhetoric question); see (39b, 40b). 
Polish
(39a) *Nieprawda, że Piotr podobno/rzekomo/jakoby stracił pracę.6 
  ‘It’s not true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’
(39b) ??Prawda, że Piotr podobno / rzekomo/jakoby stracił pracę.
   ‘It’s true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’
German
(40a) *Es stimmt nicht, daß Peter angeblich seine Arbeit verloren hat.
   ‘It’s not true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’
(40b) ??Es stimmt, daß Peter angeblich seine Arbeit verloren hat.
   ‘It’s true that Peter {hs} has lost his work.’
Thus, not all tests applied by Korta and Zubeldia lead to identical results in 
different languages. Scope tests as means of crosslinguistic comparison require 
a thorough check and clarification.
Regardless of this caveat, according to Korta and Zubeldia (2014: 417), omen 
also shares the property that it “admits any option between a fully determinate 
or specific original speaker and a fully indeterminate or nonspecific one”. We 
5 The authors explicitly stress that this “utterance must be interpreted as(25) and not as (26):
(25) It is not true that someone else stated that it is raining.
(26)  Someone else stated that it is not true that it is raining.” (Korta and Zubeldia 2014: 404)
6 Cf. Grochowski et al. (2014: 107) for podobno.
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are not sure whether this applies to German and Polish reportive adverbs, too. 
As we showed in Wiemer and Socka (2017: Section 2.2.2), the Polish units may 
differ in aptness to occur in an environment in which a specific original speaker 
is mentioned. More importantly, Korta and Zubeldia also conclude that, with 
omen, “the expression of uncertainty is a GCI.” However, they link it to the se-
cond maxim of Quality in its original formulation by Grice: ‘Do not say that for 
which you lack adequate evidence’; it is “for this reason that the speaker pro-
duces an omen-utterance instead of an utterance without it” (Korta and Zubel-
dia 2014: 411f.). This attempt to explain the trigger for the GCI with a maxim of 
Quality somewhat surprises. Admittedly, by adding omen to an utterance with 
some propositional content P, the speaker lets the hearer know that asserting P 
does not rely on direct (or at least personal) experience, so this might be un-
derstood as a “lack of adequate evidence”, i.e. of evidence for which the speaker 
could vouch with full responsibility. However, adding omen to an utterance ver-
balising P eo ipso entails marking the utterance as containing something more 
than just the content of P plain and simple. In 3.2.3 and 3.3 we argued that such 
an addition can also be captured as evoking the Manner maxim, which, in turn, 
can raise an inference based on the I-Principle. At the very least, we can say that 
a quality maxim cannot be considered as an independent, or isolated, mecha-
nism triggering the GCI of epistemic reservation.7
5. Conclusions
Let us summarize our discussion. We have dealt with implicatures that can be 
phrased like this:
(Imp1) ‘I say P, and P was / has been said by other people’ (hearsay) +> ‘I do not / can-
not know whether P is true or not’ (epistemic agnosticism),
This attitude (let’s call it ‘epistemic distance’) often gives way to two differ-
ent implicatures that bear on the epistemic assessment of P:
(Imp2) +> ‘I think that P can be not true’ (doubt),
7 We should also realize that the Quality maxims have been considered (and probably rightly 
so) as superordinate creatures, in comparison to the rest of Grice’s maxims. According to Horn 
(2004: 7), “many (…) have accorded a privileged status to Quality, since without the observation 
of Quality, or (…) the convention of truthfulness, it is hard to see how any of the other maxims 
can be satisfied.” Although Aikhenvald (2004: passim, and elsewhere) repeatedly emphasized 
that evidential marking is not about truth, but rather about “being accurate” (as for source of 
information), speakers of respective languages can cheat by using the “wrong” markers (and 
then be regarded either as liars or as “incomprehensible” or dull people). This is tantamount to 
a violation of the second maxim of Quality. But by this violation, such speakers simultaneously 
fail to obey the I- and/or the M-Principle.
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or stronger: 
(Imp3) +> ‘I don’t think that P is true’ (rejection). 
The question is whether these implicatures, especially (Imp2) and (Imp3), 
are only pragmatically inferred or can lay claim to being stable ingredients of 
specific linguistic units. We hope to have shown that sentence adverbs with 
a common reportive component, i.e. a shared meaning as paraphrased in 
(Imp1), that is part of their coded meaning (= allegedly-units) differ regard-
ing the status of implicatures (Imp2) and (Imp3) in at least two respects:
1. Some allegedly-units show implicature (Imp2), some show implica-
ture (Imp3).
2. For either of these implicatures, the following applies: it can either re-
main pragmatically conditioned (inferred) or become a stable part of 
meaning (coded).
Further findings can be summarized as follows:
3. For all Polish and German allegedly-units analyzed, the implicature 
(Imp2) or (Imp3), respectively, can best be characterized as a GCI, while 
Russ. jàkoby has (Imp3) as a conventionalized part of its meaning. There 
is a continuum with the clear cases of Pol. podobno and Basque omen (im-
plicature Imp2 as a GCI) and Russ. jàkoby (implicature Imp3 not as a GCI, 
but as a coded part of its individual meaning) at its poles; the other units 
are situated somewhere in-between. See Figure 6 where this continuum is 
depicted with the aid of double-sided arrows and the placement of most 
of the units in the middle part between implicatures (Imp2) and (Imp3).
4. Epistemic agnosticism is a precondition for implicatures (Imp2) and 
(Imp3) to arise, and for them to be cancelable (in case they function like 
a GCI). We think that the relation between the reportive component and 
epistemic agnosticism is conceived of best as a communicative default.
5. As far as these implicatures are concerned, there is no difference in prin-
ciple between grammatical evidentials and lexical markers of informa-
tion source, or any kind of evidential strategy.
6. Contrary to grammatical evidentials (in particular, reportives), the seman-
tics of allegedly-units usually comprises additional, more idiosyncratic 
meaning components like, for instance, those related to origo-exclusive-
ness (see Wiemer and Socka 2017: Section 2.2.2). These make their condi-
tions of usage more specific and contribute to their internal differentiation, 
among other things when it comes to interaction with various discourse 
genres, communicative situations and superordinate illocutionary goals 
(see below). From a lexicographic point of view, such individual meaning 
components should be accounted for in a more fine-grained description 
on deeper levels of semantic organization. See Figure 6, where the vertical 
arrows indicate the layering from more to less generalizable properties.
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CODED in all units: reportive component   epistemic agnosticism (by default) +>
‘I say P, and P was/has been said by other people.’ ‘I do not/cannot know whether P is true or not.’
Implicatures (2)
‘I think that P can be not true’
(3)
    ‘I don’t think that P is true’
Pol. podobno
Basque omen
Pol. ponoć, jakoby, rzekomo
(for further details, see
Figure 4 in Part 1)
Germ. angeblich
inferred
(GCI: cancellable)
  
Russ. jàkoby
coded 
(no GCI)
 item-specific components:  e.g., origo-exclusiveness (‘distance’)
    GCI for Pol. rzekomo (genre-specific)
Figure 6. Layered structure of the meaning of hearsay markers (common and individual com-
ponents)
There is another conclusion relating to the pragmatic machinery:
7. Whatever maxim (or maxim combination) triggers the GCI (see 3.3), 
we should take into account potential communicative mismatches be-
tween the speaker’s intention and the addressee’s interpretation of the 
message containing the reportive marker. Such mismatches become 
possible on the basis of epistemic agnosticism (see conclusion 4. above): 
it can be exploited to give way either to a lower-bounding or to an up-
per-bounding implicature (I- vs. Q-Principle),8 or the addressee impli-
cates just on the basis of a marked form (M-Principle) that there is a 
“surplus” of meaning. However, an M-based implicature by itself im-
plies a paradigmatic contrast (with an utterance without the additional 
modifier); it is, therefore, difficult to distinguish from an I-based impli-
cature, and we cannot exclude that both work together.
Regardless, there is no reason to believe that such mismatches only occur 
with lexical markers of hearsay, they may also take place with grammatical ev-
identials. They might, however, differ as a consequence of the degree of ex-
pectability and, thus, of paradigmatic contrast between an evidentially marked 
vs. unmarked utterance: grammatical markers are, in general, more frequent 
and, as a consequence, tend to be more expectable than their lexical source 
8 See Faller (2012), who claims that by using reportive items the speaker induces the scalar 
implicature that s/he does not have direct evidence for the proposition expressed.
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expressions (or equivalents), up to becoming obligatory. Increase of expectabil-
ity lowers markedness (given the right communicative circumstances and ra-
tional behavior of the interlocutors). It remains to be investigated whether, for 
allegedly-units, or other lexical markers of information source, expectability 
is enhanced (and markedness, thus, lowered) in specific types of contexts (in 
particular, text genres) in a similar manner as with grammatical evidentials, 
and if this might be an explanation for their epistemic overtones that, in turn, 
can be suppressed under individual circumstances. What is needed for a check 
of such assumptions is a reliable and objectified measure of expectability.
At present, we feel unable to make a decision about what exactly triggers 
the GCI behind the implicature (Imp2) and (Imp3): some maxim of Quality, 
the I-Principle, the M-Principle, or any combination of them? But whatever 
the solution may be, if GCIs can be shown to be triggered by principles used 
in post-Gricean (in particular, Neo-Gricean) frameworks, these are principles 
working on a micro-communicative level. They can easily be overridden by 
stronger factors like those occupying the three upper levels in Gazdar’s ‘Impli-
cature cancelation procedure’ (see 3.3). For this reason, and finally, let us stress 
that, if we want to capture the meaning potential of expressions used for indi-
cating information source from a usage-based perspective, one has to account 
for higher-order routines rooted in attitudes to communicative situations and 
cultural background, including knowledge about discourse genres. To these, 
we have to add some more factors pointed out in Aikhenvald’s (2004: 331) hi-
erarchy. However, this line of reasoning could not be pursued further in this 
paper. Let us be reminded that the question of whether GCIs can be consid-
ered to be universal remains an open issue. If they are not, the whole endeav-
or of crosslinguistic comparison of the relation between evidential and epis-
temic components in the semantics of markers of information source – be they 
grammatical or lexical – gets much more complicated.
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